Commentary, At Issue – House Rules: Is a Supermajority Requirement for Tax Hikes Constitutional? – No, The Framers Had Only a Simple Majority in Mind by Bloch, Susan Low
Georgetown University Law Center 
Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 
1997 
Commentary, At Issue – House Rules: Is a Supermajority 
Requirement for Tax Hikes Constitutional? – No, The Framers Had 
Only a Simple Majority in Mind 
Susan Low Bloch 
Georgetown University Law Center, bloch@law.georgetown.edu 
 
 
This paper can be downloaded free of charge from: 
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1564 
 
Susan Low Bloch, Commentary, At Issue – House Rules: Is a Supermajority Requirement for Tax 
Hikes Constitutional? – No, The Framers Had Only a Simple Majority in Mind, 83 A.B.A. J., 79 
(Mar. 1997) 
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Law and Politics Commons 
- AT ISSUE
House Rules
Is a supermajority requirement for tax hikes constitutional?
In 1995, on the first day of the 104th Congress,
the House of Representatives amended House Rule
XXI, which governs the consideration of bills, to
require a three-fifths majority vote to pass any
increase in income tax rates. Anyone who had doubts
about the new Republican majority's determination to
rein in taxes, the action seemed to say, need not have.
But voices were raised immediately, and critics
continue to decry the measure as unconstitutional.
Some contend that by restricting the rights of the
majority, such a requirement undercuts our entire
system of government. Others look to the text of the
Constitution and find no prohibition against adding a
new supermajority requirement (to those already
constitutionally mandated to impeach officials and
ratify treaties, for example).
John 0. McGinnis, a professor at Benjamin N.
Cardozo Law School of Yeshiva University in New
York City, and Michael B. Rappaport, a professor at
University of San Diego School of Law, have pub-
lished articles on supermajority-rule constitutionality
and written about separation of powers. They argue
that the rule change passes constitutional muster.
Opposing them is Susan Low Bloch, a constitu-
tional law professor at Georgetown University Law
Center who clerked with Justice Thurgood Marshall.
She says such a change represents a threat to the
balance of power among the branches of government.
Yes: Each chamber can adopt its own procedures
Although opponents of this three-
fifths rule have brought a lawsuit chal-
lenging its constitutionality, we believe
the rule is wholly constitutional.
The Constitution gives each house the
authority "to determine the rules of its pro-
ceedings." The three-fifths rule is a rule of
proceeding because it governs the internal
operations of the House of Representatives.
Thus, the House may enact the three-fifths
rule so long as it does not violate another
provision of the Constitution.
Opponents of the rule fail to identify
a constitutional clause that prohibits the
three-fifths rule. The Constitution does not
specify the proportion of legislators neces-
sary to pass a bill. Rather, it simply states
that bills must "pass" each house.
The silence of the Constitution on the
type of majority required to pass a bill is
not the result of inattention to the issue.
Instead it reflects the framers' intent to
permit the houses of the legislature to de-
cide the question. When the Constitution
actually mandates a legislative majority,
as it does for quorums, or a supermajority, as it does
for treaties, it does so explicitly.
Other venerable rules, such as the filibuster and
the committee system, support the constitutionality of
this rule. Like the three-fifths rule, these rules temper
the power of legislative majorities in order to advance
other values such as legislative deliberation. If the fil-
ibuster and the committee system are constitutional,
so is the three-fifths rule.
Opponents of the three-fifths rule often charge
that it is antidemocratic, but the rule is entirely con-
sistent with majority control. A majority of
the House of Representatives voted for the
rule, and a majority can waive or repeal it
at any time. A legislative rule that could not
be repealed by a majority would be uncon-
stitutional because it would function like a
constitutional amendment. But the three-
fifths rule does not suffer from this defect.
Another argument that has been
raised against the three-fifths rule is that
it somehow aggrandizes the role of the
House of Representatives in the legislative
process. The three-fifths rule, however,
completely conforms to the constitutional
separation of powers.
First, it is even odd to describe the
three-fifths rule as expanding the authority
of the House; the rule limits the House's
power to pass bills. More fundamentally,
the Constitution gives each house the power
to refuse to pass legislation for virtually any
reason. Thus, the Senate cannot complain
if the House refuses to pass legislation the
Senate proposes. Similarly, the Senate may
not object to rules that make it harder for
the House to pass such legislation.
In addition to being constitutional, the three-fifths
rule is also good policy. For the last 50 years the re-
public has been beset by a difficult problem: Concen-
trated interest groups can successfully obtain benefits
for themselves and place the costs on a diffuse, legisla-
tively ineffective popular majority.
The three-fifths rule should be celebrated as a
modest attempt to restore the power of popular ma-
jorities without taking the more radical step of amend-
ing the Constitution.
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Taxation Tally
Recent federal income tax rate increases and the votes by which they 71RR7
passed the House of Representatives:
111 Bill number: HR. 5835
0 Raised income taxes on high-income taxpayers by setting the
,nius Budget top bracket at 31% instead of 28%.
"' ,ecnciation~ - N Passed Oct. 27,1990; 228-200.
,ct 1990 N Voting ye!: 181 Democrats and 47 Republicans.
U Voting no: 74 Democrats and 126 Republicans.
NE Bill Number: H.R. 2264.
N Raised income taxes on high-income taxpayers by setting
~mnibus Bud el new top brackets of 36% and 39.6% (up from 31%).
_econiliakon r__ I Passed Aug. 5, 1993:218-216
F, U Voting yes: 217 Democrats and one independent.1 99 Voting no: 41 Democrats and 175 Republicans.
Unde e th  ne rules. a tnree fifths majorit-261 memi ers-must approe an)
bill increasing ircome taxes
Sources ' Major Deficit Reduction Measures Enacted in Recent Years.' Congressionai
Research Service. and Congressional Quarterify s Guide to [IS Electons, Third Edition
Since the 63rd Congress (1912-1914)-the first with
435 members-17 Congresses have been ruled by a
three-fifths majority of either major party:
Congress
102nd
98th
96th
95th
94th
89th
87th
86th
81st
77th
76th
75th
74th
73rd
71st
67th
63rd
Election
year
1990
1982
1978
1976
1974
1964
1960
1958
1948
1940
1938
1936
1934
1932
1928
1920
1912
Party
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
R
R
D
Majority
members
267
269
277
292
291
295
263
283
263
267
262
333
322
313
267
300
290
No: The framers had only a simple majority in mind
The supermajority requirement under-
mines the constitutional principles of Arti-
cle I and separation of powers. Rule XXI is
not merely a rule of internal procedure; it
determines xxhen bills get presented to the
Senate and the president.
Article I, § 7 provides that "every Bill
which shall have passed the House ... and
the Senate, shall, before it becomes a Law.
be presented to the President of the United
States." The presumption is that '-passed" BY SUS
means "ag-eed to by a majority of a quo- LOW B
rum." The question is whether either house
can change that meaning and insist that
"passed" requires more than a majority.
While the Constitution does not explicitly deny ei-
ther house the power to require a supermajority, that
is true of many limits we infer from the structure of the
Constitution. Article 1, § 7 is a carefully crafted mech-
anism that struck a balance between large and small
states, the House and the Senate, and Congress and
the president. By adopting the three-fifths rule, the
House upsets this balance and unconstitutionally in-
trudes on the powers of the Senate and the president.
The framers knew how to say they wanted a su-
permajority and, in fact, said so in several contexts.
Proponents of the supermajority rule argue that the
fr-amers may have meant this list to be simply the min-
imal list of occasions that require supermajorities, and
that they intended to allow Congress to add to the list.
Considering the distorting impact that supermajor-
ity requirements can have on the other branches, I con-
clude that when the framers did not specify a superma-jority for bill passage, they not only presumed a majority
would be sufficient, they in fact intended not to allow ei-
ther chamber to increase the number of votes required.
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There is no limit on the supermajority
rule. Thus, the House could require even
more than a 60 percent majority for se-
lected topics or even for all legislation.
Even if most representatives and a majori-
ty of senators want a particular bill, the
bill could not get presented to the presi-
dent and could never become law. If the
House can do this, it has the power unilat-
erally to enhance its power vis A vis theN Senate and the president.OCH Furthermore, if the House can adopt
a rule like this, so can the Senate. Article I,§ 5 provides that "each House may deter-
mine the Rules of its Proceedings." Thus, the Senate
could say: "No judge or cabinet official, once nominat-
ed by the President, shall be considered as confirmed
except by a three-fifths vote."
If the Senate were allowed to adopt such a rule, it
would be able singlehandedly to upset the carefully
crafted rules concerning appointment of both executive
officials and judges, and to unilaterally limit the power
the Constitution gives to the president in the appoint-
ment process. The Senate would thus be able to ag-
g-randize its own role and unconstitutionally distort the
balance of powers established by the Constitution.
Defenders of the rule say: "Don't worry; a simple
majority can repeal the rule." But I see nothing in their
logic that stops the House fi'om requiring that repeal of
the supermajority rule itself requires a supermajority.
When a chamber of Cong-ess by its rules goes be-
yond internal housekeeping and affects the relationship
among the other institutional players, it aggrandizes
its powers and unconstitutionally distorts the "single,finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure"
carefully crafted by the framers. U
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